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Abstract
This paper draws on a natural experiment to identify the relationship between income and trust.
We use a unique panel dataset on Russia where GDP experienced an 8 percent drop in 2009. The
effect of the crisis had been very uneven among Russian regions because of their differences in industrial
structure inherited from the Soviet times. We find that the regions that specialize in producing capital
goods, as well as those depending on oil and gas, had a more substantial income decline during the
crisis. The variation in the industrial structure allows creating an instrument for the change in income.
After instrumenting average regional income, we find that the effect of income on generalized social
trust (the share of respondents saying that most people can be trusted) is statistically and economically
significant. Controlling for conventional determinants of trust, we show that 10 percent decrease in
income is associated with 5 percentage point decrease in trust. Given that the average level of trust in
Russia is 25%, this magnitude is substantial. We also find that post-crisis economic recovery did not
restore pre-crisis trust level. Trust recovered only in those regions where the 2009 decline in trust was
small. In the regions with the large decline in trust during the crisis, trust in 2014 was still 10 percentage
points below its pre-crisis level.
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1 Introduction
In 1958, American sociologist Edward C. Banfield identified a set of norms and beliefs that allegedly held
back the Southern Italian village of “Montegrano”(Banfield (1967)). According to Banfield, Montegrano
residents were so deeply suspicious towards each other that any collective project became impossible and
any attempt to foster civic life would be futile. In short, the economic and social development of Montegrano
was impeded by the lack of what modern scholars call “social capital”.
Since then, social capital has become one of the most important concepts in social science. Scholars argue
that the social capital plays a key role in the production of human capital and public goods (Coleman (1988)),
good governance (Putnam et al. (1994)), financial development (Guiso et al. (2004)), political participation
(DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), Berman (1997), Satyanath et al. (2013)), efficiency of the judiciary system
(La Porta et al. (1997)), political accountability (Nannicini et al. (2010)), labor market institutions (Algan
and Cahuc (2009)). Economists have always tried to understand, whether through these or other channels,
the social capital has an impact on growth and development. Using country-level and state-level data,
Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), Knack (2003), Dincer and Uslaner (2010), Algan and
Cahuc (2010), Bjørnskov (2012), Algan and Cahuc (2013) studied the correlation between social capital and
economic growth (or income per capita) generally finding that the social capital (in most cases quantified as
generalized trust, or the propensity to trust others) is positively correlated with economic growth.
Given the substantial contribution of social capital to development and growth, it is important to under-
stand what determines the level of social capital in the first place. Banfield’s original work offered several
explanations of the lack of social capital in Montegrano, but his first choice was the low standard of living.
Montegrano was a poor village where 80 percent of households lived off subsistence farming. A threat of
hunger was imminent. Banfield argued that the constant focus on survival led to what he called “amoral
familism”, or the lack of willingness to cooperate with other villagers outside the nuclear family. Banfield
named poverty as the first determinant of the lack of social capital: “The dreadful poverty of the region
and the degraded status of those who do manual labor ... are surely of very great importance in forming it
[amoral familism]” (Banfield (1967), p. 139).1
There are at least two reasons to believe that income can affect social capital. First, higher incomes
may lead to higher trust because better-off individuals feel more secure economically and are less averse
1Banfield then discussed three other factors contributing to the ‘amoral familism’: likely premature death, inefficient land
tenure institutions, and the underdeveloped institution of the extended family. However, in the beginning of the Chapter 8
“Origins of the Ethos” he emphasized that the discussion of three other elements “is not to depreciate the importance” of the
poverty and the degraded status.
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to risk. Since trusting other people may bring both positive and negative returns depending on how the
counterpart reciprocates, lower risk aversion may contribute to higher propensity to trust others. Second,
higher incomes may lead to higher trust because individuals use income as an observable statistic to infer
the degree of fairness of the world around them (and therefore the returns to trusting others).2 Suppose that
an individual’s income depends on both her own contribution and on that of the rest of the world; and that
the individual cannot directly observe her own productivity. Then individuals who observe higher income
attach a higher probability to the scenario that the others are fair towards them.
The cross-sectional evidence from the literature suggests that at both the individual level and at the
state level trust is indeed associated with higher income (see, among others, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)
and Algan and Cahuc (2013)). However, establishing a causal relationship between income and trust is
difficult as this requires identifying an episode where both income and trust change substantially and where
the change in income can be instrumented by a factor that does not affect trust directly.
In this paper, we consider such a natural experiment. We use a large regionally representative survey
administered to 34 000 Russians in the second quarter of 2008 and in the first quarter of 2009, before and
after the main shock of the 2008-09 crisis. During this crisis, Russia experienced an acute drop in income;
in 2009, Russian GDP contracted by 8% – the largest decline among G20 countries. The fall in GDP in
the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 was 19% and 17% in annual terms (constant prices,
seasonally adjusted). The Russian stock market peaked exactly in the second quarter of 2008 (the dollar-
denominated RTS Index reached the all-time high 2488 on May 19, 2008; this record has never been broken
afterwards). Respectively, in the first quarter of 2009 Russian market bottomed out: on Jan 23, 2009 RTS
traded at only 498 — just at 20% of its value at the peak. The average value of the RTS index in the second
quarter of 2008 was 2277, the average value in the first quarter of 2009 was only 592, or 74% lower.
Most importantly, the effect of the crisis was very uneven across Russia. If we ranked Russian regions
by their real GDP per capita growth in 2009, the top quartile would grow by 1 percent, while the bottom
quartile would decline by 20 percents. The heterogeneity of the response to the crisis was at least partially
explained by the different compositions of the regional economies. As in every recession, the decrease in
investment is substantially larger than that in consumption, hence the regions that were more dependent on
capital-goods-producing industries, and manufacturing in general, suffered the most. At the same time, the
regions specializing in consumer goods and services experienced only a moderate GDP fall or even continued
to grow.
2A similar assumption is used in the seminal paper by Piketty (1995) who studies the effect of the learning from past income
experiences on the preferences for redistribution and therefore social mobility in equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Output of the Largest Sectors of the Russian Economy in the Second Quarter of 2008 and in the
First Quarter of 2009.
Source: Rosstat, Bank of Russia, billions of 2008 rubles. Average exchange rate in this period was 26 rubles
per U.S. dollar
Figure 1 shows the output decline in the five largest sectors of Russian economy (i.e., retail, construction,
natural resources, manufacturing, and real estate) between the second quarter of 2008 (the last pre-crisis
quarter) and the first quarter of 2009 (the lowest point of the cycle). The largest decline took place in
manufacturing and in natural resources with both shrinking by more than 40% from the second quarter of
2008 to the first quarter of 2009. The 2008-09 crisis was accompanied by a deep fall in the world prices for
natural resources; in particular, the price for oil, the main Russian export commodity, went down by a factor
of three from peak (also, in the second quarter of 2008) to trough (in the first quarter of 2009).
Russia’s regions vary greatly in terms of the composition of the regional GDP: in 9 out of 66 regions
in our sample the share of manufacturing in GDP is below 10 per cent, while in two regions the share
of manufacturing is more than 50 per cent. The variation is inherited from Soviet industrialization and
is plausibly exogenous to the events of 2008-09. This allows constructing an instrument for the potential
impact of crisis on income. We use the data on the composition of the Soviet economy compiled by Brown
et al. (1993) from the last Soviet industrial census of 1989. For each region of Russia, we use the share
of employment in 1989 in (i) production of industrial machinery and equipment (SIC code 35), (ii) metal
products (SIC code 33), and (iii) oil and gas (SIC code 13). High share of employment in the first two
sectors in 1989 is a good predictor of the share of manufacturing and capital goods producing industries in
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2008. Similarly, the share of employment in oil and gas in 1989 is a good predictor of oil and gas output in
2008. The Soviet industrial structure turns out to be a strong instrument for the change in income between
the middle of 2008 and the beginning of 2009: the first-stage F-statistic is above 10, and the bias of 2SLS is
safely below 15% of OLS estimation, according to Stock-Yogo critical values for weak identification (Stock
and Yogo (2002))3.
After instrumenting the change in regional income with the Soviet employment in manufacturing and oil
and gas, we find that the effect of change in income on change in trust is statistically significant and large
in magnitude. Controlling for other conventional determinants of trust, we show that 10 percent decrease in
income is associated with 5 percentage point decrease in the share of respondents who say that most people
can be trusted. For Russia, it is a large effect: indeed, the average level of trust in our data is 34 per cent
in 2008 and 19 per cent in 2009.
In order to understand the persistence of the destruction of the social capital during the 2009 crisis, we
commissioned another survey of the same sample of regions in April 2014. By that time, Russian economy
recovered after 2009 shock; Russia’s GDP even exceeded the pre-crisis level. We found that in the regions
where trust declined moderately during the 2009 crisis, trust did reach and even exceeded the pre-crisis levels
(by 1.5 percentage points). However, in the regions where the 2009 shock resulted in the large decline in trust,
the impact of the shock still persisted in 2014. In the latter regions, trust in 2014 was 10 percentage points
below the pre-crisis levels. Our evidence therefore suggests that large shocks to trust may have long-lasting
effects.
In this sense, our paper contributes to the literature on the long-run impact of recessions on employment
(Røed (1996), Røed (1997), Blanchard and Summers (1986)). In particular, our paper provides evidence
on a channel through which this effect might operate: recessions destroy social capital that is needed for
productive cooperation. Our results are consistent with Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) who show that
people facing recessions and macroeconomic disasters in their formative years have distinctly different beliefs
— supporting government redistribution and voting for left-wing parties. Our results are also consistent
with Fisman et al. (2013) who show in a laboratory setting that people who experience losses are more likely
to behave selfishly.
In sum, we demonstrate that trust can change quickly in response to economic shocks, and that the
implications of those shocks are persistent. This conclusion is new since most of the scholarship on this topic
emphasizes deep historical roots of social capital. Following Putnam et al. (1994), who famously attributed
3All estimations have been done in R©Stata using ivreg2 package (Baum et al. (2007)).
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low levels of social capital in the Southern Italy to the legacy of late-medieval autocratic Norman regime,
authors demonstrate that norms and values today are influenced by the legacies of colonial era (Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011)), Black Death in Europe (Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2011)), Pale of Settlement in Imperial
Russia (Grosfeld et al. (2012)), communism in Eastern Europe (Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011)), Hindu caste
system (Hoff et al. (2011)).
These studies have rather pessimistic policy implications. If social capital is determined by long-term
history, then the government’s capacity to build social capital is limited. While we do not disagree with
those results, our analysis suggests that social capital does have a substantial malleable component that can
be influenced by economic policies. For example, if during economic crisis government undertakes generous
counter-cyclical fiscal policy, it can prevent the destruction of social capital and thus preclude the long-lasting
negative effects of economic shocks.
Our paper therefore contributes to the debate between “Putnam I” and “Putnam II”. As discussed in
Algan and Cahuc (2013), “Putnam I” (following Putnam et al. (1994)) states that trust is very stable over
time, and is to a large extent determined by history, while “Putnam II” (after Putnam (2001)) argues that
trust can change substantially in a shorter period of time. While these views do not need to contradict each
other, our study can be interpreted as an attempt to quantify the magnitude of “Putnam II”, as we show
that trust does respond to economic shocks very quickly and estimate this effect.4 On the other hand, in line
with “Putnam I”, we also find that large negative shocks to trust may be persistent with trust remaining
lower even after income recovers after the crisis.
We also make a methodological contribution to the research on the relationship between social capital and
growth. Most of this literature is based on cross-sectional OLS regressions and therefore cannot overcome
the issue of causality. As both growth and social capital depend on a multitude of social and political
characteristics, it is very hard to come up with a convincing instrument.5 One notable exception in this
literature is Algan and Cahuc (2010) who use the data on the origin of immigrants coming to the United
States and timing of their families’ arrival to the US. Similarly to the previous studies (e.g. Rice and
Feldman (1997), Putnam (2001), Guiso et al. (2006)), Algan and Cahuc (2010) find that the social capital
of the US immigrants is correlated with the social capital in their home countries and therefore can be used
4Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) also find a relationship between social capital, namely trust in government and financial
institutions, and economic shocks during the recent crisis and show that state-level economic shocks do result in lower trust in
institutions. Our analysis is different as we study generalized social trust rather than trust in institutions, and that we examine
an economy where economic shocks were significantly larger and more heterogeneous. Also, we use an instrument for economic
shocks.
5See Durlauf (2002), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005), and Blume et al. (2010) on the methodological challenges in the
econometric research on social capital.
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as an instrument for the inherited trust in their countries of origin. They show that inherited trust explains
a large part of variation in economic performance in 48 countries. Our paper also uses the instrumental
variable approach but we consider the opposite question — whether economic growth influences trust.
We should make two caveats. First, social capital is a broad concept; in this paper we study a very specific
and well-defined aspect of social capital – “generalized social trust”, the answer of survey respondents to the
question “Do you think most people can be trusted or one cannot be too careful dealing with other people?”
There are other dimensions and measurements of social capital (e.g., membership in formal and informal
clubs and associations) (Putnam (2001), Skocpol and Fiorina (1999), Skocpol (2003)). Guiso et al. (2010)
suggest to introduce a narrower definition – that of the “civic capital” or the set of beliefs that promote
cooperation and help overcome free-riding problem. Aghion et al. (2010) understand civic behaviour in a
similar way and show that it can be a substitute for regulation. Both Guiso et al. (2010) and Aghion et al.
(2010) suggest that one way to measure civic capital is indeed to administer surveys on generalized trust.
Our second caveat is that our quasi-experimental setting only allows to study the determinants of change
in trust and not its implications. As crises and recessions have many negative social implications, our data
do not allow separating the impact of the fall in trust and direct effect of income shocks. In this paper, we
only identify the effect of income on trust; we rely on the large body of research discussed above that shows
that trust is important for the political, economic and social development.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on the Russian crisis
of 2008-09 that motivates our choice of the instruments. In Section 3 we discuss hypotheses, econometric
specifications and data. In Section 4 we report the main results. In Section 5 we carry out placebo tests and
robustness checks. Futhermore, we provide evidence that the exclusion restriction holds. We also show that
large changes in income and trust during the crisis are also observed in other countries. We find that the
cross-sectional evidence from the Life in Transition Survey (covering 35 East and West European countries)
is consistent with our results. We also estimate cross-sectional regressions and show that the results are
comparable to those in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) who use similar data on the US. In Section 6 we study
the evolution of trust in Russian regions after the crisis and analyze the evolution of trust after the crisis.
Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Spatial Dimension of the 2008-09 Crisis in Russia
In this paper, we view the global economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 as a “natural experiment” that helps
us identify the effect of income on trust. While there are many explanations of the crisis’ causes, for the
purpose of this study we only need to assume that the crisis was global, and that the crisis has not originated
in Russia.
During the crisis, GDP of the advanced economies declined by 3 percent in 2009; according to the
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database, this was the only year since 1980 when
advanced economies had a negative GDP growth. Major stock market indices plummeted nearly by half
from peak to trough.
In Russia, the problems were much more acute than in the other large economies. Annual GDP went
down by 8 percent in 2009, constituting the largest decline in G20. The shock was not only huge, but
sudden: Russian authorities, public, and the business community were caught by surprise. Treisman (2012)
reports that, according to the Renaissance Capital (then second largest Russian investment bank), in August
2008 “Moscow was flooded with international bankers competing to provide money to Russian entities”. In
October, “the only financiers visiting were those trying to get their money back”. According to the World
Bank, net inflow of foreign direct investment in Russia fell by a factor of two: from $75 billion in 2008 to
$36.5 billion in 2009.6 The dollar-denominated RTS index of the Russian stock market fell by 80% (peak to
trough).
The fact that Russia was caught by surprise explains why the shock of the crisis was not initially mitigated
by policy response. The first anti-crisis plan was adopted by the Government of Russia only on April 9,
2009.
The large, unexpected,and unmitigated collapse of the Russian economy creates a quasi-experimental
setting for the analysis of impact of income on trust. Our data on generalized trust come from two surveys
administered right at the pre-crisis peak of the second quarter of 2008 and at the bottom of the crisis in the
first quarter of 2009 (see Figure 2).
The basic macroeconomics of the business cycle implies that recessions hurt investment more than con-
sumption. Investment is typically pro-cyclical and the most volatile part of GDP. Figure 2 shows that the
aggregate consumption dropped by 3% in the first quarter of 2009 compared to the second quarter of 2008,
while aggregate investment dropped by 50% during the same period (both in constant prices, seasonally
adjusted).
6http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD
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Figure 2: Russia’s GDP, Consumption, Investment, and Government Spending in 2008-2014.
Note: Constant prices, seasonally adjusted, normalized to 100 in the first quarter of 2008. Source: Official
data (Rosstat).
In addition to the fall of demand for investment, the global crisis brought down the global price of oil.
According to the US Department of Energy, the average oil price in Europe in the second quarter of 2008
was 121 US dollars per barrel (this maximum has never been observed neither before nor after). The oil
price then fell to 44 dollars per barrel in the first quarter of 2009 (its lowest level in 2005-2014) and recovered
afterwards.
The crisis therefore had a very different impact on different Russian regions hurting especially strongly
those dependent on capital goods and oil. In Russia, industries are heavily concentrated. In more than 20
Russian regions a single industry accounts for more than 40 percent of industrial production.7 For example,
ferrous metallurgy constitutes 70 percent of manufacturing of Lipetskaya Oblast (region in Western Russia
with 1.5 million people), 65 percent of Chelyabinkaya Oblast (region in the Urals with nearly 4 million
people). Overall, in an average Russian region the share of the top industry in the total industrial output is
29.3 percent.
The geographical concentration of industry is inherited from the Soviet times. The location of the
main Russian industrial assets still reflects the decisions made by Soviet leadership many decades ago. For
example, Lipetskaya Oblast is dependent on the production of steel making because of the Novolipetsk Steel
– the third largest steel plant in Russia. This plant was built in 1934. One of the main industrial assets of
Chelyabinskaya Oblast is Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works which was founded in 1926.
7Natalya Zubarevich, “Evaluation of Impact of Crisis on Russian Regions”, Independent Institute of Social Policy, February
2009. http://www.cscp.ru/content/16/10944/
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Path dependence of economic activity is a widely recognized phenomenon: Krugman (1991) points out
that today’s concentration of manufacturing in the United States reflects early colonial agricultural set-
tlements in the Northeast. As for the Soviet regional development, Mikhailova (2012) shows that Stalin’s
industrial policy had long-lasting impact on the growth of Russian cities. Cities that had labor camps estab-
lished by GULAG (Stalin’s Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements) within
50 kilometer distance, grew faster than the cities with the similar observable characteristics. The difference
in population persists until 2010, and the effect is larger for the GULAG camps that specialized in build-
ing industrial infrastructure, than for the camps that specialized in agriculture and forestry. This evidence
strongly suggests that the geographical structure of Russian economy is to a large extent pre-determined by
the Soviet heritage and is exogenous to the change in trust between 2008 and 2009. This exogeneity allows
us to identify the causal effects of income on trust.
Our instrument is based on the data on the composition of industrial employment in 1989 (see Brown et al.
(1993)). These data come from the 1989 Census of Soviet Manufacturers, the last enterprise census carried
out in the command economy before the transition began. This Census has two important advantages. First,
the existing institutions of central planning still provided high reliability of the data. Second, the Census
pre-dated transition to market and disintegration of Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union hence being exogenous to
market forces. Following Brown et al. (1993), we do not rely on Soviet prices; we use the data on employment
structure rather than on composition of ruble sales.
Using the 1989 survey of industrial enterprises for each region of Russia, we calculate Soviet Capital Goods
Employment as this region’s shares of employment in industries with Standard Industrial Classification 13,
33 and 35 (“oil&gas”, “primary metal industries” and “industrial machinery and equipment”, respectively)
in 1989.8
Soviet-time employment shares turn out to be a strong predictor of today’s economic structure. In
particular, the relationship between employment in the Industrial Machinery and Equipment in 1989 and
the share of manufacturing in regional GDP in 2008 is positive and statistically and economically significant
(see Figure 3). One percentage point change in the employment in the Industrial Machinery and Equipment
in 1989 corresponds to 2.4 percentage points in the share of manufacturing in regional GDP in 2008.
Following the logic above, Soviet industrial employment is also correlated with the change in income
during the crisis. For example, Figure 4 shows the plot of change in the regional per capita GDP between
2008 and 2009 and the employment in Industrial Machinery and Equipment in 1989. One percentage point
8In Section 5 we also run regressions using just two out of the three instruments.
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Figure 3: Employment Share in Industrial Machinery and Equipment in 1989 and the Share of Manufacturing
in Regional GDP in 2008.
Source: 1989 Soviet Industrial Census, Rosstat
deviation in the share of employment in Machinery and Equipment corresponds to 1.3 percent of decrease in
income during the crisis; for the Primary Metal Products the respective number is 2.6 percent; for Oil and
Gas – 4 percent.
3 Hypotheses, Econometric Specification, and Data
3.1 Hypotheses and Specification
Our identification strategy is designed to test a causal notion that more people in a society start to distrust
each other as their incomes go down. If this claim is true, the data should reject the null hypothesis about
the absence of any statistical association between income and trust:
H0: Change in trust from 2008 to 2009 does not differ between the regions with different predicted change
in income.
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Figure 4: Machinery and Equipment in 1989 and Change in Regional Per Capita GDP from 2008 to 2009.
Source: 1989 Soviet Industrial Census, Rosstat
In order to test the hypothesis we need to estimate the following specification:
∆Trusti = α+ β∆Incomei +
∑
k
γk∆Xki + i
Here, Trust is an average level of trust in the region i at period t, ∆Trusti is the change in Trust from the
second quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, ∆Incomei is the respective change in log regional income
between 2008 and 2009, ∆Xki are the changes (between 2008 and 2009) in the other correlates of trust
established in the literature: average age (Mishler and Rose (2001)), public goods, higher education (Kumlin
and Rothstein (2005)), inequality (Knack and Keefer (1997)). To reject H0, the coefficient at ∆Income must
be large in magnitude and significantly different from zero.
As Income is an endogenous variable, we use the 2SLS procedure with the first stage as follows:
∆Incomei = κ+ λSovietIndustrialStructurei +
∑
k
µk∆Xki + ui
Here SovietIndustrialStructurei are the values of the instruments introduced in Section 2.
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3.2 Data
Our data come from two sources: the Public Opinion Foundation (Fond Obschestvennogo Mneniya, or
FOM) and the Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat). FOM conducts large regionally representatives
GeoRating Surveys repeated quarterly since 2003. Nearly 34 000 randomly selected Russian households in
66 regions (where 90 percent of Russian population lives) are surveyed about their economic conditions and
expectations, political positions, opinions on current events, and demographic characteristics.
FOM selects respondents using a three-step stratified sample. In the first step, districts are selected to
ensure geographical representation (for example, the shares of urban and rural population in the sample
are chosen to match the population). In the second step, the settlements are selected randomly with the
probability of each settlement to be selected equal to the share of population living there. In the third step,
households are selected using random walk procedure. A respondent within a household is selected using
gender, age, and educational quotas calculated from the National Census.
Trust is measured by the response to the question “Do you think that most people can be trusted or one
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” This question was asked twice: the first time in the second
quarter of 2008, and the second time in the first quarter of 2009. So, our time dimension includes just
two periods. While the regions of the survey were the same both times, the households were different. So,
for every region we divide respondents between into 3 locations: regional center (for example, Lipetsk in
Lipetsk region), non-center urban area (for example, all the cities and towns in Lipetsk region except for
Lipetsk itself), and rural area (all the villages). For each of these locations we calculate average values of
the variables of interest from the individual responses. Income is measured by the regional Gross Domestic
Product per capita deflated by the regional consumer price index.9 In the robustness checks we also use
nominal GDP per capita and real GDP deflated by GDP deflators; the results are similar.
Since our instrument and the income variable are measured at the regional level, we always cluster
standard errors at the regional level as well.
Data on the respondents’ age and level of education also come from FOM surveys. Data on inequality
and homicide rates come from Rosstat (and are also therefore also at the regional level). Table 15 in the
Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the variables for both years.
9The survey includes a question about personal income as well: “Declare, please, at least approximately, your income in
last month per family member.” The respondents are instructed to report their income in one of 15 pre-defined intervals. These
intervals are however very broad: the average difference between lower and upper bounds of the intervals is 26%. These data
are therefore not suited for measuring change of income over time. In Section 5.5 we use them for cross-sectional regressions.
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4 Results
4.1 Main Results
We first present the OLS results. We regress the difference in trust between 2008 and 2009 on the difference
in log GDP per capita and an array for controls (Table 1). The point estimate varies from 0.12 to 0.24, and
is not statistically different from zero in most specifications.
While OLS results cannot reject the absence of the effect of income on trust, these estimations cannot be
interpreted causally for two main reasons that can attenuate the real effect. Firstly, there can be endogeneity,
since the difference in GDP per capita and the difference in trust can be jointly determined by a change in
an omitted variable. Secondly, as it is usual for difference-in-difference estimation, measurement error can
be a serious problem, because GDP is persistent, especially between the two adjacent years, and the measure
is imperfect, the noise can attenuate the effect.10
Both of these problems can be addressed through the instrumental variable approach. It alleviates the
measurement error, and since the Soviet industrial structure is measured before the crisis of 2009, it is
plausibly exogenous to the change in trust between 2008 and 2009.
Table 2 shows the results of the first stage of the 2SLS procedure. In all the specifications, the Soviet-time
composition of employment does predict the change in income. The instruments are statistically significant
and economically relevant predictors of the extent of the crisis in a region. One standard deviation (1.7
percentage point) increase in the employment share in SIC33 in 1989 implies a 4% decline in the regional
income in 2009. One standard deviation (1.7 percentage point) change in the SIC35 employment share in
1989 adds another 2% change in regional income. Finally, one standard deviation (half a percentage point)
change in the SIC13 employment share in 1989 adds another 2% change in regional income.
Table 3 and Figure 5 present the second stage results, where the levels of trust are regressed on predicted
levels of income and a set of controls. The coefficient at the change in real GDP per capita are statistically
significant in all the specifications. They are also economically significant varying from 0.48 to 0.63. This
implies that a 10 percentage point fall in income (this is by how much Russian GDP contracted in real
terms between the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009) corresponds on average to about 5-6
percentage points decrease in trust. The effect is substantial given that the average level of trust in Russia is
relatively low: in 2009, only 19% of FOM respondents told interviewers that most people can be trusted.11
10In order to mitigate the problem of the measurement error, we also run OLS and 2SLS regressions where we use quartiles
of change in GDP instead of continuous GDP changes (see Section 5.2).
11Figures 8 and 9 in the Appendix present the cross-national scatter plot of trust and GDP per capita. Trust in Russia is 25
percentage points, roughly the same as the world average (25%) and very close to the cross-country trend both in 2005-08 and
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Table 1: Change in Trust and Real GDP Per Capita: OLS Estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real GDP per Capita Change 0.148 0.131 0.121 0.124 0.132 0.243*
(0.108) (0.104) (0.108) (0.106) (0.119) (0.134)
Homicide Change 0.00120 0.00102 0.000983 0.000654 0.000261
(0.00176) (0.00172) (0.00165) (0.00175) (0.00170)
Gini Change 1.683 1.754 1.379 2.247
(1.443) (1.444) (1.587) (1.471)
Education Change -0.188 -0.0769 -0.148
(0.223) (0.290) (0.295)
Age Change 0.0603 0.0983
(0.142) (0.143)
Age Squared Change -0.000416 -0.000809
(0.00159) (0.00159)
Constant -0.132*** -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.120***
(0.0141) (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0167)
Observations 198 195 195 195 195 189
R-squared 0.012 0.010 0.017 0.020 0.085 0.111
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the share of people who answered that “most people can be trusted”
in a particular location between 2008 and 2009. The change in the log regional GDP per capita is taken from
Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat). Changes in Gini and changes in homicide rate are also taken from
Rosstat. Individual characteristics (Education, Age, and Age squared) are calculated using the survey responses
averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center urban area, and rural area in a region. Education
is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree. Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per
100 000 people in a year calculated at the regional level. In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the
fastest falling regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively). Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: First Stage Estimates: Determinants of the Change in Real GDP per capita.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary Metals 1989 -2.55*** -2.52*** -2.63*** -2.66*** -2.69*** -2.03***
(SIC33) (0.67) (0.68) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.38)
Machinery&Equipment 1989 -1.30** -1.52** -1.36** -1.32** -1.32** -1.37**
(SIC35) (0.61) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.59) (0.56)
Oil&Gas 1989 -4.10*** -4.27*** -4.03*** -4.07*** -4.06*** -3.89***
(SIC13) (1.27) (1.26) (1.24) (1.24) (1.21) (1.16)
Homicide Change -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0013
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Gini Change 0.0038*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0036***
(0.00049) (0.00050) (0.00051) (0.00041)
Education Change 0.14 0.11 0.095
(0.20) (0.21) (0.23)
Age Change 0.090 0.066
(0.082) (0.083)
Age Squared Change -0.0010 -0.00080
(0.00090) (0.00091)
Observations 198 195 195 195 195 189
R2 0.380 0.429 0.466 0.469 0.474 0.428
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the log regional real GDP per capita between 2008 and 2009. All
explanatory variables are calculated using two repeated cross-sections of 66 Russian regions. Individual
characteristics (Education, Age, and Age squared) are averaged out at the level of location: regional center,
non-center urban area, and rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college
degree. Gini is the regional Gini coefficient. Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000
people in a year calculated on a regional level. In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling
regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively). Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Second Stage Estimates: Determinants of Change in Trust.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real GDP Per Capita Change 0.48** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.51** 0.71***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
Homicide Change 0.0025 0.0027 0.0027 0.0022 0.0017
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Gini Change -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0036***
(0.00086) (0.00085) (0.00081) (0.00087)
Education Change -0.22 -0.11 -0.18
(0.26) (0.33) (0.37)
Age Change 0.047 0.088
(0.14) (0.14)
Age Squared Change -0.00026 -0.00066
(0.0015) (0.0016)
Observations 198 195 195 195 195 189
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 10.9 12.2 11.8 12.1 12.5 22.4
Note:All variables are calculated using two repeated cross-sections of 66 Russian regions. Individual characteristics
(Trust, Education, Age, and Age squared) are averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center
urban area, rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree. Gini is the
regional Gini coefficient. Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000 people per year
calculated at the regional level. In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling regions
(Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively). In all specifications, Hansen J test of overidentification never rejects the null
hypothesis. Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 5: Second Stage Results: Specification (5) from Table 3, Residuals of Trust Change and the Predicted
Income Change (Instrumented by 1989 Employment Shares of SIC33, SIC35 and SIC13).
4.2 Channels of Impact of Income on Trust
Income can affect trust through at least two mechanisms that we described in Introduction. First, as risk
aversion usually decreases with income, a lower income may make individuals more risk-averse and therefore
less prone to trust others. Second, a decrease in income may result in individuals’ updating of their beliefs
about the fairness of the world hence reducing their willingness to trust others.
In order to distinguish between the two stories, we estimate the differences in the effect of change in
income on change in trust for different categories of individuals. In particular, we test whether the effect is
stronger for subsamples stratified by age, education and personal income.
The second mechanism (related to learning/inference of the fairness of the world) should be more pro-
nounced for younger individuals (who are early on in the process of forming their beliefs about the outside
world) and less important for the educated individuals (who may have other signals about the outside world
rather than just their own income).
The predictions regarding the first mechanism (related to risk-aversion) are less clear and depend on the
2010-13 waves of the World Values Survey.
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functional form of the utility function. Indeed, given the income, the older and the poorer individuals are
more risk-averse. However, the effect of age on the marginal change of risk-aversion to change in income
depends on the utility function’s third derivative. For a standard utility function with a constant relative
risk aversion the first mechanism should be more salient for the older individuals (they should be more
risk-averse) and for the poorer individuals.
The results for the subsamples are presented in the Table 4. Each column presents the second stage
estimates where the first stage is the same as in the Table 1, specification (5). The dependent variable is the
average level of trust within the subregion for the individuals with a specific characteristic (low, medium,
high income, young, middle-aged, senior, and with and without higher education). In the case of income
and age, we divide the sample into three equal terciles, while in the case of education we just separate those
with and without tertiary education.
Table 4: Results for the Subsamples: Second Stage IV Estimates.
Income Age, years Education
Low Medium High 18-34 35-53 54+ Low High
Real GDP 0.67* 0.36 1.05** 0.83* 0.82** 0.53 0.72** 0.91
Change (0.35) (0.36) (0.46) (0.44) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.56)
Homicide 0.0027* 0.00066 0.0012 0.0020 0.0013 0.00058 0.0015 0.0012
Change (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0029)
Gini -0.18** -0.062 -0.61*** -0.25** -0.18* -0.36*** -0.28*** -0.10
Change, x100 (0.086) (0.096) (0.12) (0.11) (0.094) (0.090) (0.086) (0.14)
Education 0.096 -0.034 -0.79 -0.52 -0.26 0.051 -0.27 -0.55
Change (0.29) (0.35) (0.56) (0.54) (0.39) (0.28) (0.36) (0.49)
Age 0.084 0.14 0.010 -0.021 0.011 0.14 0.032 0.041
Change (0.18) (0.26) (0.25) (0.20) (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.32)
Age Squared -0.063 -0.12 0.015 0.055 0.015 -0.14 -0.0092 -0.024
Change, x100 (0.20) (0.30) (0.28) (0.22) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.36)
N 195 193 195 195 195 195 195 195
Note: All specifications, independent variables and sources of data are the same as in Table 3. The dependent variables is the
change of trust for the subsample of individuals from the bottom tercile, the medium tercile and the top tercile of income,
respectively, for young, middle-aged and senior, and for the subsamples with and without higher education. Robust standard
errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find that the effect of income on trust holds for the individuals with higher income, lower education,
and for those of younger age. The second and the third results are consistent with the inference mechanism.
The first and the third result are in contradiction with the risk aversion mechanism. Overall, the results
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presented in the Table 4 are in support of the “inference” explanation.
Our results on the effect of age should be treated with caution. Since we only have one historical episode
we cannot distinguish between the age effect and the cohort effect. Older Russian may have had very different
life experiences from those of the younger Russians. Unfortunately, measuring the effect of differential life
experiences is impossible without a long-term panel of data on trust.
5 Additional Evidence
5.1 Placebo Tests
In this section we test whether our result (the correlation between decline in income and decline in trust)
is not an artefact of correlation between trends in these two variables. To check this, we use yet another
GeoRating survey by FOM. In the third quarter of 2007 the survey included a question on trust although it
allowed for fewer response categories (this is why we do not use it in the main regression).
If our results are driven by the trends in income and trust that are unrelated to the effect of income
on trust, we should find a correlation between the change in income instrumented by the structure of the
regional economy and the change in trust between 3Q2007 and 2Q2008.
We estimate an instrumental variables specification where the change in income is still instrumented
by the 1989 industrial structure, but in the second stage we study the impact of the change in income on
the change in trust between 2007 and 2008. Effectively, we test whether our results would still hold for the
period between 3Q2007 and 2Q2008. If we found significant positive coefficients in the second stage, it would
imply that the relationship between income and trust is due to unobserved factors unrelated to the crisis.
Indeed, in Russia the period between 3Q2007 and 2Q2008 was still a period of growth rather than that of
recesssion. According to official data, Russian GDP in 2Q2008 was 7% higher than in 3Q2007 (in constant
prices, seasonally adjusted).
The second stage results are presented in Table 5. The coefficients are negative and insignificant. This
shows that our results presented in Table 3 are not due to pre-existing trends but are indeed related to the
shock of crisis that took place between the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.
20
Table 5: Placebo Tests, Second Stage Estimates.
Dependent Variable: Change in Trust in 2007-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real GDP Change -2.70 -3.33 -7.25 -6.63 -6.85 -4.83
(5.66) (6.35) (24.4) (21.5) (23.6) (11.4)
Homicide Change -0.0063 -0.030 -0.027 -0.028 -0.020
(0.022) (0.11) (0.098) (0.11) (0.055)
Gini Change 15.2 14.3 14.6 9.97
(48.7) (43.5) (47.3) (22.0)
Education Change 0.53 0.52 0.54
(1.23) (1.25) (0.86)
Age Change -0.27 -0.26
(1.02) (0.64)
Age Squared Change 0.0029 0.0028
(0.011) (0.0069)
Observations 198 195 195 195 195 189
Note: All specifications, independent variables and sources of data are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the regional level. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
5.2 Regressions with a Discrete Measure of Recession
In order to make sure that the results are unlikely to be driven by the measurement error (as is always a
risk with difference-in-difference estimation), we re-estimate the main OLS and 2SLS specifications using a
discrete measure of recession. Instead of using a continuous value of change in real GDP per capita, we use a
categorical variable with 4 values: 1 – for the bottom quartile of change in GDP between 2008 and 2009 (fall
in real GDP per capita between 39% and 15%), 2 – for the second-from-the-bottom quartile (fall between
15% and 9%), 3 – for the third-from-the-bottom quartile (fall between 9% and 5%), 4 – for the top quartile
(GDP change from -5% to +10%).
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 6. In our preferred specifications, the coefficient
on a quartile of change is around 0.02 implying that one quartile change is associated with 2 percentage
point of change in trust. So, the change from the bottom to top quartile is associated with 4 percentage
point change in trust, while the change from minimal level of GDP change to the maximum level of GDP
change is associated with 8 percentage point of change in trust.
Table 7 presents the results of 2SLS estimations where the quartile of change in GDP is instrumented
by the Soviet-era industrial structure. As in the previous estimations, we find a statistically significant and
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Table 6: Trust and Quartiles of GDP Change: OLS estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quartile 0.0160* 0.0150 0.0149 0.0153* 0.0185* 0.0213**
(0.00918) (0.00930) (0.00926) (0.00912) (0.00944) (0.00978)
Homicide Change 0.00152 0.00136 0.00132 0.00113 0.000671
(0.00180) (0.00175) (0.00167) (0.00173) (0.00169)
Gini Change 1.800 1.882 1.483 2.237
(1.385) (1.380) (1.534) (1.453)
Education Change -0.209 -0.0943 -0.162
(0.215) (0.287) (0.284)
Age Change 0.0491 0.0869
(0.139) (0.141)
Age Squared Change -0.000274 -0.000670
(0.00156) (0.00157)
Constant -0.185*** -0.176*** -0.174*** -0.175*** -0.185*** -0.193***
(0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0264) (0.0270)
Observations 198 195 195 195 195 189
R-squared 0.024 0.021 0.029 0.033 0.106 0.125
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the share of people who answered that “most people can be trusted”
in a particular location between 2008 and 2009. Quartile is a quartile of change in log regional GDP per capita.
The change in the log regional GDP per capita is taken from Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat). Changes in
Gini and changes in homicide rate are also taken from Rosstat. Individual characteristics (Education, Age, and Age
squared) are calculated using the survey responses averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center
urban area, and rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree.
Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000 people in a year calculated at the regional level.
In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively).
Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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large effect of change in GDP on the change in trust. In our preferred specification, an increase in GDP
change by a quartile is associated with 4 percentage points of increase in the change in trust. Therefore a
two-quartile change (from the region with 15 percent fall in GDP to 5 percent fall in GDP) is associated with
8 percentage point fall in trust; this is similar to our 2SLS estimates with a continuous measure of change
in GDP (where a 10 percent change in GDP is a associated with 5-6 percentage point change in trust.
Table 7: Trust and Quartiles of GDP Change: 2SLS Estimates, Second Stage.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quartile 0.0404*** 0.0443*** 0.0410*** 0.0410*** 0.0400*** 0.0470***
(0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.0138)
Homicide Change 0.00298 0.00267 0.00260 0.00221 0.00174
(0.00208) (0.00200) (0.00189) (0.00179) (0.00176)
Gini Change 1.700 1.804 1.381 2.437
(1.555) (1.544) (1.634) (1.561)
Education Change -0.261 -0.125 -0.205
(0.229) (0.304) (0.308)
Age Change 0.0314 0.0708
(0.138) (0.140)
Age Squared Change -5.37e-05 -0.000455
(0.00154) (0.00157)
Constant -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.253***
(0.0348) (0.0332) (0.0349) (0.0339) (0.0335) (0.0329)
Observations 198 195 195 195 195 189
First Stage F-stat 15.62 16.16 13.26 14.3 16.08 15.18
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the share of people who answered that “most people can be trusted”
in a particular location between 2008 and 2009. Quartile is a quartile of change in log regional GDP per capita.
The change in the log regional GDP per capita is taken from Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat). Changes in
Gini and changes in homicide rate are also taken from Rosstat. Individual characteristics (Education, Age, and Age
squared) are calculated using the survey responses averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center
urban area, and rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree.
Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000 people in a year calculated at the regional level.
In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively).
Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.3 Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
In order to test the robustness of our results, we perform a number of additional tests. First, we try to
understand whether any of our three instruments is critical for our results. We remove one instrument at
a time and re-estimate regressions with just two remaining instruments. The results are presented in the
first three columns of the Tables 8 (the first stage) and 9 (the second stage). The first specification (using
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the metal products and machinery and equipment only) is especially important as the allocation of oil and
gas production may be driven by geographical characteristics that may affect change in trust through other
channels.
Table 8: Robustness Checks, First Stage Estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Change in real GRP per capita
Primary Metals 1989 (SIC33) -2.58*** -3.11*** -2.59*** -2.73***
(0.65) (0.52) (0.68) (0.68)
Machinery&Equipment 1989 (SIC35) -1.12* -2.21*** -1.50** -1.24**
(0.59) (0.63) (0.61) (0.54)
Oil&Gas 1989 (SIC13) -3.35*** -3.26** -4.32*** -4.05***
(1.19) (1.30) (1.23) (1.17)
Homicide Change -0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0033 -0.0017 -0.0014
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Gini Change 0.0041*** 0.0046*** 0.0028*** 0.060 0.0037***
(0.00049) (0.00029) (0.00050) (0.14) (0.00052)
Education Change 0.095 0.18 0.013 0.085 0.12
(0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)
Age Change 0.089 0.085 0.047 0.088 0.048
(0.088) (0.090) (0.090) (0.080) (0.066)
Age Squared Change -0.0010 -0.00098 -0.00054 -0.0010 -0.00058
(0.00096) (0.00098) (0.00099) (0.00087) (0.00072)
Trust in 2007 0.21**
(0.10)
Observations 195 195 195 195 195
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 15.8 22.4 7.0 12.9 12.4
Note: All specifications, independent variables and sources of data are the same as in Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the regional level. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
In all three cases, the effect of income on trust is significant; its magnitude does not change. In one of
the specifications, the F statistic falls to 7 (this is when we only use shares of SIC38 and SIC13 sectors but
drop SIC33). In the first specification where we do not use the share of employment in oil and gas, the F
statistic actually increases to 15.
In the fourth column, we reproduce our results with an alternative measure of inequality, the Gini
coefficient based on the self-reported income categories (see Section 5.5 for a detailed description of these
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Table 9: Robustness Checks, Second Stage Estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real GDP Change 0.48** 0.51** 0.51** 0.45** 0.51**
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.19) (0.22)
Trust in 2007 -0.24
(0.18)
Homicide Change 0.0021 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0017
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Gini Change -0.0028*** -0.0029*** -0.0029*** -0.79*** -0.0027***
(0.00090) (0.00098) (0.0010) (0.28) (0.00077)
Education Change -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.018 -0.11
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.25) (0.32)
Age Change 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.073 0.095
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Age Squared Change -0.00027 -0.00026 -0.00026 -0.00059 -0.00079
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Observations 195 195 195 195 195
Note: All specifications, independent variables and sources of data are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the regional level. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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data). We find that the change in this Gini coefficient is negatively correlated with change in trust but its
use does not affect the magnitude or the statistical significance of the impact of change in income on change
in trust.
The main alternative explanation for our results is that the Soviet industrial structure affects change in
trust during the crisis through channels different from change in income. It is entirely plausible that regions
that have inherited industries specializing in capital goods production and in oil and gas differ from other
regions in many respects, including the social fabric and the level of social capital. However, it is not clear
why these differences should affect the change in trust during the crisis. If anything, these regions should
have become more—rather than—less resilient to economic volatility. In order to check whether the level of
trust matters for our estimations of the effects of change in income on trust, we carried out several tests.
First, we checked whether the level of trust is correlated with our instruments. We ran a regression of the
level of trust in 2007, 2008 and in 2009 on our instruments and found that the three instruments together
explain less than 3% of variation in the level of trust in either year. We also found that neither of three
instruments is correlated with the level of trust, except for a positive correlation between the level of trust
in 2008 and the share of employment in the Primary Metals in 1989 (with F statistics equal to 5).
Our second test of this alternative explanation involved controlling for the level of trust in our main
regression. The results are presented in the column (5) in Tables 8 and 9. We include the level of trust in
2007 and find that the impact of change in income on change in trust remains the same in both statistical
and economic significance. The level of trust in 2007 positively affects the change in income during the crisis
(i.e. the locations with higher trust had lower decrease in income during the crisis). In the second stage, the
coefficient at the level of trust is not significant. This implies that controlling for the change in income the
initial level of trust in 2007 has no impact on the change of trust between 2008 and 2009; nor controlling for
the initial level in trust has an effect on the magnitude and the significance of the effect of change in income
on change in trust.
We also checked (regressions available on request) whether the relationship between trust and income is
non-linear. We ran specifications with squared change in income as well as used a semi-parametric estimation
for regressions in Table Table 3. We found no non-linearities. The coefficient at squared income change is
not significant, and the non-parametric relationship between change in trust and change in income (Table 3
and Figure 5) is virtually linear.
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5.4 International Evidence
The results above provide evidence on the relationship between income and trust within one country. In order
to understand whether these results are driven by unique features of Russia, in this section we study data
from the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) run by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the World Bank in 2006 and 2010. We will try to see, first, to what extent a large change in the level
of trust observed in Russia in 2009 is unusual, and, second, whether the decrease in income due to the crisis
has a similar effect on trust in other countries, not just in Russia.
In 2006, LITS covered 29 transition countries (including Mongolia and Turkey). In 2010, it was expanded
to 35 countries adding France, Germany, Italy, Kosovo, Sweden, and the UK. In each country, the survey was
administered on a representative sample of about 1000 respondents in rural and urban primary sample units
(PUs) with 20 respondents per PSU (with about 2000 PSUs). Figure 6 shows the change in average level
of trust in countries that participated in both 2006 and 2010 surveys along with the average annual growth
rate of GDP between the two surveys. We see that large changes of trust during this period were quite
common.12 Also, except for few outliers (Slovakia plus the war-torn Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan),
there is a positive correlation between GDP growth and change in trust. The slope of this relationship is
about 0.24 percentage point change in trust for one per cent change in GDP.
In 2006 and 2010, LITS was undertaken in different locations. Therefore we cannot carry out a difference-
in-differences exercise similar to the one we did for Russia in Section 4. Also, the sample was not represen-
tative at the PSU level. Therefore the evidence in this section can only be viewed as illustrative. Yet, it is
interesting to see whether the relationships between effect of the crisis, income, and trust still hold in the
international data, at least in cross-sectional correlations.
We use 2010 individual data to calculate vulnerability to crisis. Following Grosjean and Ricka (2013), we
use their “synthetic consumption response index” as a proxy for the effect of the crisis: we add up positive
responses to the questions about whether individual had to reduce consumption of staple food, limit tobacco
smoking, delay medical appointments, postpone buying necessary medications, and accumulated arrears on
utility bills.
The results are presented in the Table 10. In Column 1 we regress the individual level of trust on the
“synthetic consumption response” controlling for individual characteristics and country dummies. We find
a negative and significant coefficient at the consumption response variable. This effect does not change
12See also Grosjean and Ricka (2013), who use LITS data to show that crisis also resulted in large changes in attitudes to
market and to democracy.
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Figure 6: GDP growth and change in Trust between 2006 and 2010
Sources: Life in Transition Survey, World Development Indicators.
magnitude and remains significant even when we control for the average consumption response within the
PSU. The effect of average consumption response itself, however, is small and not significant.
In Columns 3 and 4 we investigate the relationship between crisis impact, trust, and income. LITS
does not include questions on income per se, yet the respondents provide their relative rank in income
distribution within a country. Therefore, once we control for country dummies, we can use this variable as
a measure of household income. We find that income is indeed lower in households who report a higher
consumption response (Column 3). We also find that income and trust are positively correlated even if
control for consumption response (Column 4). Moreover, once we include income, the consumption response
becomes insignificant. This is consistent with a conjecture that crisis impacts trust through income.
Figure 10 in the Appendix presents a scatter plot of the predicted probability of trust (from the linear
probability model of Column 1) and the consumption response.
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Table 10: Individual-level OLS regressions based on the Life in Transition Survey.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust Trust Income Trust
Consumption Response -0.0154*** -0.0149*** -0.265*** -0.00793
(0.00378) (0.00303) (0.0208) (0.00573)
Average Consumption Response -0.00213
(0.0120)
Income 0.3080***
(0.0039)
Female -0.0162*** -0.0162*** -0.0820** -0.0223**
(0.00563) (0.00563) (0.0339) (0.00994)
Education 0.0682*** 0.0682*** 0.482*** 0.0490***
(0.00733) (0.00733) (0.0377) (0.0114)
Age 0.000457 0.000448 -0.0132** 0.00111
(0.00103) (0.00102) (0.00601) (0.00186)
Age Squared -1.12e-06 -1.04e-06 3.08e-05 -1.35e-05
(9.57e-06) (9.54e-06) (5.79e-05) (1.72e-05)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,864 38,864 13,967 13,967
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.142 0.066
Note: Consumption Response is a measure of reduction of basic consumption items (stable food etc.) constructed
by a procedure of Grosjean and Ricka (2013). Income is the self-reported decile of within-country income
distribution. Source: Life in Transition Survey 2010.
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5.5 Individual Level Regressions: Cross-Sectional Evidence
In this section, we use the FOM data on Russia to estimate cross-sectional individual-level relationship
between income and trust. The cross-sectional regressions cannot resolve the endogeneity problem. For
example, if a person has high income and high level of trust, it may mean that her level of trust is high
because of high income. But the causality may also go in opposite direction: a person has high income
because social capital helps to advance her career. Nevertheless, the results of such estimations might be
viewed as a suggestive evidence.
Moreover, these results are important for checking whether behaviour of generalised social trust in Russia
is similar to the one in other countries. We compare the results to the individual level regressions in Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002) (who use the General Social Survey in the US). We find that signs and even magnitudes
of coefficients of respondents of the FOM survey in Russia are generally similar to those found by Alesina and
La Ferrara (2002). This further suggests that our data on trust are comparable to those in other countries
and that our results are not likely to be driven by certain Russia-specific factors.
We estimate probit regressions separately for 2008 and 2009 cross-sections. The dependent variable is 1
if the respondent says that “most people can be trusted” and is 0 if they say that “one cannot be too careful
dealing with other people”. We also include age, age squared, gender, income, and education. For income,
we use self-reported income data. The survey asks whether the household’s per capita monthly income is in
one of 16 broad categories.13
The 2009 survey also included questions on the respondents’ employment status and occupation (if
employed). The descriptive statistics of the employment status and occupational dummies are reported in
Table 16. In order to make 2009 results comparable to those of 2008, we run the estimations for 2009 both
with and without employment status and occupational dummies.
The results are presented in Table 11. We report marginal effects. In regressions (1), (3), (5) we include
regional dummies and control for the type of the subregion (rural, urban or regional center, with the latter
being the omitted category).14 In regressions (2), (4), (6) we include subregional dummies.
In all specifications trust is positively correlated with personal income. 10% increase in personal income
is associated with 0.8 percentage points increase in a probability of a person trusting others in 2009 survey.
In 2008 survey, the effect is twice is large. In Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) the coefficient is similar in
13The respondents are asked whether their income is below or above the following fifteen thresholds: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 45 thousand rubles. In 2008-2009, a thousand rubles was about 30 US dollars. These categories are too
broad to use these data for change in income over time so we only use these data for the cross-sectional analysis.
14We have also run the estimations with median income, median income squared and Gini index calculated at the subregional
level. The coefficients at the individual characteristics did not change.
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Table 11: Individual cross-section regressions, probit.
Dependent variable=1 if the respondent trusts others
Year Year Year
2008 2009 2009
Log personal income 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.073***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Female 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.016 0.0099 0.015 0.0088
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Age, 0.43 0.43 0.87*** 1.04*** 0.88*** 1.09***
x100 (0.27) (0.28) (0.30) (0.33) (0.31) (0.34)
Age Squared, -0.38 -0.38 -0.46 -0.45 -0.46 -0.48
x10000 (0.28) (0.28) (0.31) (0.35) (0.31) (0.36)
Education 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.14***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Housewife 0.022 0.021
(0.063) (0.064)
Unemployed 0.017 0.0096
(0.045) (0.046)
Student 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.064) (0.065)
Retired -0.035 -0.041
(0.044) (0.045)
Rural -0.0035 0.10*** 0.098***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Urban -0.066* 0.070** 0.067**
(0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subregional dummies No Yes No No Yes Yes
Occupational dummies No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 29102 29102 28991 28991 28991 28991
Marginal effects are reported. Education equals 1 if the respondent has higher education. Coefficients at Age and Age
Squared are multiplied by 100 and 10000, respectively. Source: FOM.
Robust standard errors (clustered by 198 subregions) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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magnitude to the one we find in 2009 data: in their regressions a 10% change in income is associated with
0.6 percentage points increase in trust.
We also find a positive correlation between trust and education. Higher education is associated with 13-
16 percentage point increase in trust. This effect is also similar to the one found in Alesina and La Ferrara
(2002): there having less than 12 years of education is associated with 13 percentage point lower trust and
having more than 16 years of education is associated with 18 percentage point higher trust than for having
12-16 years of education. In Russia, having more than 16 years of education is equivalent to having post-
masters degrees and is therefore very rare; thus the main comparison in our sample is between those having
less than 12 years (secondary but no higher education) and having 12-16 years (higher education but no
post-graduate degrees).
5.6 Crisis and Trust in Government
Economic performance can have implications not only for the generalized social trust but also for the trust
in public institutions (Stevenson and Wolfers (2011)). Unfortunately, GeoRating lacks consistent questions
about the trust in public institutions and it also lacks questions where the word “trust” and any of government
officials appear in the same sentence. The closest question to the trust in government is the question about
approval of Russian then-prime minister Vladimir Putin. We find no connection in regional variation in
the changes of Putin’s approval rating and economic crisis. This may seem puzzling since other authors
document significant correlation between incumbent’s popularity and economic conditions both in hybrid
regimes and democracies (Monroe (1978), Colton and Hale (2009), Treisman (2011)).
One potential explanation for this effect would be related to the effectiveness of the anti-crisis policies that
mitigated the impact of the crisis on government’s popularity.15 However, in our case, the relief efforts started
after the first quarter of 2009 (when our survey on trust was administered). A more plausible explanation
is that during the crisis, the government stepped up propaganda efforts to convince the Russian households
that the crisis was driven by external factors and has nothing to do with the government’s performance. We
leave a more systematic analysis of this phenomenon to future research.
15Lazarev et al. (2014) find that in the Russian villages that suffered from 2010 forest fires the support for the government
increased substantially. They explain this increased support as the perception of the effectiveness of the government’s relief
efforts.
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6 Persistence of the Decline in Trust
We have shown that Russian regions exposed to the the crisis of 2008-2009 had a larger decrease in trust
than the regions with the smaller exposure. Is the effect persistent? Does trust go up again when economy
recovers or does it remain stuck at the low level? In this section, we offer evidence that suggests the effect
is persistent at least in some regions; trust does not always improve even when the income is restored.
In 2014, we asked the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) to include once again the question about
generalized trust in their GeoRating survey. The survey was conducted in April 2014 using the same
methodology and same locations as the surveys in 2008 and 2009.
As shown in Figure 2, by 2014 Russian GDP did recover from the 2009 crisis and exceeded its pre-crisis
level. In the second quarter of 2014, Russian GDP was 5% higher (in constant prices, seasonally adjusted)
than in the second quarter of 2008.
On average, the level of trust did increase after the fall in 2008: it was 34 percent in 2008, 19 percent in
2009, and 29 percent in 2014. However, this improvement has not been uniform: trust has recovered in the
regions where it had not gone down significantly in the first place. In those regions, where trust decreased
significantly in 2009, it remained far below its pre-crisis levels even in 2014.
To demonstrate this, we divide the sample into two halves based on the median change in the level of
trust between 2008 and 2009 and compare the subsequent changes in trust between 2009 and 2014. If the
initial decrease in trust was larger than the median (15 percentage points), we call such a decrease “large”;
if it was smaller than the median, we call it “small”.
Table 12 shows the evolution of trust since 2008 in the full sample of Russian regions, in the regions with
the large 2009 decrease in trust, and in the regions with the small 2009 decrease in trust. In the full sample,
between 2008 and 2009 trust decreased by 15 percentage points, and then increased by 10 percentage points
between 2009 and 2014. The areas with the small initial decrease in trust have recovered to the initial level
(and even slightly exceeded it), but the areas with large initial drop in trust have not. Between 2009 and
2014 trust in those areas went up by 14 percentage points; trust remained about 10 percentage points lower
than its pre-crisis level.
The differences in the changes in trust between regions with large and small drops are economically
important and statistically significant. Table 13 shows results of the following simple estimation:
TrustChange0814i = α+ βLargeDecreasei + i
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where TrustChange0814i is a change in trust between 2008 and 2014 in a subregion i, and LargeDecreasei
is an indicator variable for a decline in trust between 2008 and 2009 being larger than the median (larger
than 15 percentage points).
These results imply that in the regions where the impact of the crisis (the change in 2008-2009) was
large, the long-term (2008-2014) decrease was also 11.5 percentage points larger. In the other regions, the
difference between 2008 and 2014 levels of trust was positive and small (+1.5 percentage points) and not
significantly different from zero.
Table 12: Evolution of Trust in Russian Regions in 2008-2014.
Level in year Change between Change between
2008 2008 and 2009 2009 and 2014
Full Sample 0.34 -0.15 +0.10
Subsample: “Large Decrease” 0.39 -0.23 +0.14
Subsample: “Small Decrease” 0.28 -0.06 +0.08
Table 13: Long-Term Change in Trust.
Change in Trust Between 2008 and 2014
Large Decrease in Trust -0.115***
(0.0240)
Constant 0.0154
(0.0198)
Observations 195
R-squared 0.125
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the regional level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To show that the trust was more likely to recover in places, where the initial drop was not small, we
estimate the following regression for the two subsamples:
TrustChange0914i = α+ β1TrustChange0809i + β2GDPpcChangei +
+ β3EducationChangei + β4GiniChangei + i
where TrustChange0914i is the change in the level of trust in subregion i between 2009 and 2014. GDPpcChange
is the change in Gross Regional Product per capita between 2009 and 2012.16 EducationChangei is a change
16We use data on year 2012 because regional GDP data on 2013 and 2014 are not available. However, given that Russian
GDP only grew at 1.3% in 2013 and at 0% in the first quarter of 2014, the 2009-12 recovery is likely to be representative of the
whole 2009-14 period. By the end of 2012, Russia’s GDP was 4% higher its 2008 level.
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Table 14: Changes in Trust Between 2009 and 2014.
Subsample: Subsample: Full sample
large decrease small decrease
Trust change 0.0281 0.00173 -0.573*** -0.637*** -0.301*** -0.270**
in 2008-2009 (0.145) (0.157) (0.191) (0.203) (0.111) (0.106)
Per capita GDP 0.106*** 0.134*** 0.684*** 0.441* 0.140** 0.153***
change (0.0255) (0.0294) (0.248) (0.239) (0.060) (0.048)
Education -0.0263 0.718*** 0.355**
change (0.160) (0.207) (0.152)
Gini -0.376 0.0684 -0.309
change (0.316) (0.267) (0.242)
Observations 97 97 98 98 195 195
R-squared 0.041 0.067 0.179 0.300 0.099 0.164
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the regional level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in the proportion of people with at least incomplete higher education between 2009 and 2014, GiniChangei
is change in Gini coefficients between 2009 and 2014.
If trust recovers after the crisis, we expect β1 to be negative and large in absolute value: the larger is the
decline during the crisis, the faster the subsequent recovery.
Table 14 presents the results. We find that the coefficient β1 is negative and large only in the sample
with the small 2009 decline. In the sample with the large 2009 decline, the subsequent evolution of trust is
not related to the fall of trust during the crisis.17
If the decrease is small, then 10 percentage points of the decrease in trust in 2008-09 are associated with
6 percentage points of the post-crisis recovery. If the decrease is large, then subsequent trajectory is not
related to the initial decrease.
The results are presented in a graphical form in Figure 7. The left panel shows residual plot for the
subsample with the small decrease during the crisis, and the right panel shows the residual plot for the
subsample with the large decrease. While the regression line in the plot with the small drop has a negative
slope signifying that the recovery of trust between 2009 and 2014 was proportional to its decrease during
the crisis, the fitted line in the sample with the large drop is flat showing no relationship between the initial
drop in trust and subsequent recovery.
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that if the income shocks result in a substantial decrease
in trust then the effect may persist even after incomes bounces back to the initial level.
17We have also tried to divide the sample into the areas with large vs. small decrease of trust using the predicted (rather
than actual) change in trust during the crisis. The results (available on request) are the same.
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Figure 7: Post-2009 Recovery of Trust in the Subsamples with Small and Large Decreases in Trust in 2008-09
(Residuals).
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the relationship between changes in income and changes in trust. In order to identify
the causal effect, we use the sharp—and spatially uneven—decline in Russian GDP in the end of 2008 and
the beginning of 2009. We find that the regions, whose economy historically relied on the production of
capital goods and oil and gas, were more vulnerable to the global crisis and therefore experienced a larger
decline in trust than other regions.
We interpret this result as evidence in favor of the effect of income on trust. Alternative explanations
of our results would have to argue that regional economies specialising in capital goods may have developed
special social institutions. While it is entirely plausible to assume that such institutions affect the level of
social capital in these regions, it is difficult to understand why these institutions should have an impact on
the changes in trust over a very short period of time. And even if such a relationship between industrial
specialisation and resilience of trust to crisis existed, it would be likely to work in the opposite direction:
regions vulnerable to crisis should have been more—rather than less—resilient in the challenging times. This
is why we believe that our results imply that inherited industrial structure affects trust through income.
Our results cannot distinguish between different explanations of the relationship between income and trust
— whether it is driven by risk aversion or by inference based on income (or other potential explanations).
But whatever the origin of the effect of income on trust, its magnitude is substantial: on average, 10 percent
decline in income is associated with 5 percentage points decrease in trust. Given the low average level of
trust in Russia (25%, according to the World Values Survey), this is a substantial effect.
We also study the post-crisis evolution of trust in Russian regions to understand whether the impact
36
of crisis on trust had a persistent or transitory effect. After the deep recession in 2009 Russian GDP has
recovered back to the pre-crises levels and even exceeded them in 2012-14. Trust also rose but did not return
to its pre-crisis levels. We find that the change in trust after the crisis was very heterogeneous. In the
regions where the decline in trust was small, trust fully recovered to the pre-crisis level. However, in those
regions where the shock of crisis on trust was strong, the impact of crisis was persistent: in 2014, trust in
those regions was still 10 percentage points below the respective 2008 levels. These findings shed a new light
on our understanding of the social costs of recessions and have very clear policy implications. Governments
should respond quickly and decisively to crises with countercyclical social policies in order to prevent the
recession’s strong impact on trust — as the latter may have implications for social capital even after the
recession is over.
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Appendix
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics
Year 2008 Year 2009
mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
GDP per capita, thousand 2008 rubles per year 190 129 171 122
Trust 0.34 0.10 0.19 0.08
Education 0.151 0.08 0.152 0.08
Homicide Rate (per 100 000 citizens) 24.76 12.7 21.77 10.61
Gini 0.39 0.03 0.39 0.02
Age 44.95 2.00 44.87 1.98
Note: All variables are calculated using two repeated observations on cross-section of 66 Russian regions. Individual responses
are averaged on the level of location: regional center, urban area, and rural area in a region, therefore there are three
observations on Trust and Education in each region. Trust is a share of people respond in that most people can be trusted.
Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree. Gini is regional Gini coefficient from official data.
Homicide rate is number of murders per 1000 people per year. It is calculated on the regional level. GDP per capita is
nominal annual GDP deflated by regional consumer price index. Sources: FOM, Rosstat.
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Table 16: Gender and employment of respondents of the FOM survey
Year 2008 Year 2009
Gender
Female 0.566 0.561
Out of the labor force
Unemployed 0.068 0.109
Retired 0.292 0.281
Housewife 0.038 0.036
Student 0.040 0.032
Sectors of employment
Manufacturing 0.094 0.087
Agriculture 0.037 0.036
Construction 0.041 0.050
Services 0.065 0.087
Catering 0.014 0.013
Utilities 0.022 0.023
Research 0.010 0.004
Education 0.045 0.045
Healthcare 0.036 0.037
Media 0.021 0.010
Government 0.022 0.015
Military 0.020 0.006
Police 0.029 0.017
Retail 0.040 0.038
Consulting 0.002 0.003
Finance 0.004 0.005
Observations 27960 28991
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Figure 8: Trust and Income: Cross-National Comparison in 2005
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5, World Bank; GDP per capita for year 2005
Figure 9: Trust and Income: Cross-National Comparison in 2013
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6, World Bank; GNI per capita for year 2013
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Figure 10: Predicted Trust and Consumption Response
Source: Life in Transition Survey 2010.
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